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
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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (13 Mar 70) FOR **OT-UT-694192**

19 18 ACSFOR

18 March 1970

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

⑨ Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 69.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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ROBERT E. LYNCH

Colonel, AGC

Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-GO-0

13 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the period ending 31 October 1969 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-0
APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO
San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San
Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I - Operations: Significant Activities

a. ACofS, Personnel and Administration

(1) Personnel Management

(a) Command Military Strength: The past three months have been turbulent in both the authorized and assigned strength posture. Manpower ceilings and general order authorizations are being utilized to determine personnel assignment quotas. The authorized figures used in this report reflect the approval of MTDA P5W1ZNA01, even though the general order will not be published until February 1970.

	31 Aug 69		30 Sep 69		31 Oct 69	
	Auth	Assigned	Auth	Assigned	Auth	Assigned
OFF	496	404	487	404	475	404
WO	139	133	138	136	136	138
ENL	8988	8473	8680	7950	8647	7895
TOTAL	9623	9010	9305	8490	9258	8438

(b) Local National Civilian Employees: The direct hire authorization for the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay was reduced from 3089 to

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for the period ending 31 October 1969 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)**

2842, effective 1 August 1969. US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay absorbed the greatest portion of the loss, losing 254 spaces. A recent Manpower Survey recognized the requirement for 780 LN spaces in Depot. Based on a Reclama submitted by the Depot, USARV authorized 852 spaces pending a USARPAC decision. The reduction in spaces has had a minor impact to date on this Support Command. The hiring freeze is causing a slow but steady decrease in the assigned LN strength. Many units are experiencing difficulty in performing assigned missions due to the lack of available LN personnel.

(c) Local National Training Programs: Intensive training of Local Nationals continues at every level of command. However, more personnel are needed for training in several critical areas, but cannot be hired until the hiring freeze is lifted.

(2) Personnel Services Division:

(a) Under the auspices of Project Duty, a "Best in MOS" monthly competition program was developed in August and implemented in September. The competition recognizes those individuals who do an outstanding job, but who might not otherwise be recognized until the end of their tour. It provides a boost to morale which is considered necessary for support troops during their tour in Vietnam. Winners are selected for merit, achievements, and/or degree of accomplishment. Winners are announced in the Daily Bulletin and photo-essays on the winners performing their duties are released through the Information Office to hometown newspapers. An individual letter personally signed by the Commander is dispatched through channels to each winner. A separate letter is sent to the individual's commander recommending an appropriate award. A plaque is being designed for each winner that should produce even further incentive, motivation and dedication to excel.

(b) Results of a study conducted during this reporting period to alleviate educational deficiencies has led to the formation of a Remedial Education Program. This unique program provides for schooling on an on-duty basis and attendance may be made mandatory at the discretion of the unit commander. All personnel with a GT score of 90 or less and more than six months remaining on their current tour were identified. A letter was sent to their respective commanders requesting they be released for one hour a day six days a week and encouraged to participate in this program. Classes were started on 20 October and are progressing satisfactorily. Upon their completion of the program individuals will be of more benefit to themselves, the US Army and ultimately to their communities.

(3) Adjutant General

(a) Personnel turbulence during August and September was caused

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primarily by the programmed reduction of forces in RVN. Inactivation and redeployment of units under Quick Adjust and Keystone, coupled with a decreased number of replacement personnel were particularly significant. Requirements to fill aircraft manifests to CONUS has resulted in adjusted departures 10-15 days prior to the normal DEROS.

(b) During the month of October this command acquired approving authority for awards up to and including the Bronze Star Medal (BSM).

(4) Base Postal Office. The mission of the 39th Base Post Office remains the same except for the additional APO (Mailing Address Only) of 96392. The additional MAO (Mailing Address Only) has greatly reduced the amount of handling and delay of mail addressed to the 22nd Replacement Bn., 6th CC Hospital and numerous other North Cam Ranh Army units that formerly used MAO 96377. Postal operations conducted at the 39th BPO and its outlying detachments fall into two areas: (1) Operations, which reflect mail movement, and (2) Financial operations.

(a) Mail Movement Operations:

1. Locator. This area reflects improperly or incompletely addressed mail which must be "worked" by comparison with Locator Cards and IBM printout rosters to identify the addressee.

2. "No Record Mail" - Mail returned by addressee unit.

AUGUST	5136 pieces
SEPTEMBER	5486 pieces
OCTOBER	4321 pieces

b. "Scheme Mail" - Incorrectly addressed APO - FPO or addressed to non-existent units.

AUGUST	8101 pieces
SEPTEMBER	7403 pieces
OCTOBER	8642 pieces

c. "Mail Addressed" - Mail which has a recognizable defect which can be corrected at this level.

AUGUST	6346
SEPTEMBER	3991
OCTOBER	5101

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2. Incoming mail - Mail coming into the Cam Ranh Bay Terminals.

AUGUST	534,530 pounds
SEPTEMBER	888,381 pounds
OCTOBER	745,969 pounds

(b) Financial Operations

1. Money Order Sales

AUGUST	\$1,442,476.32
SEPTEMBER	\$1,301,965.43
OCTOBER	\$1,413,375.58

2. Stamp and Postage Meter Sales

AUGUST	\$31,685.00
SEPTEMBER	\$19,310.00
OCTOBER	\$28,165.00

(5) Information Office: During the period 1 August - 31 October 1969, the Information Office submitted 45 News Releases, 111 Photo Releases and 453 Home Town News Releases. The Information Office also hosted 37 correspondents representing various news media to include NBC, CBS, UPI, AP, Newsweek, Stars & Stripes and the Army Artist Team.

(6) Chaplain: The percentage of chapel attendance at religious services is on a gradual increase. This is due largely to the frequent Chaplain visits in the troop area. The emphasis is on "getting to know the troops." In addition to visiting the troops in their place of work, the Chaplain, on a systematic basis, visits the EM Clubs, NCO Clubs, and other areas where the soldiers assemble.

(7) Reenlistments: See Inclosure 1

(8) Unit Personnel Testing: See Inclosure 2

(9) Casualties: See Inclosure 3

(10) Promotions: See Inclosure 4

(11) Congressional Inquiries: See Inclosure 5

(12) Visitors: See Inclosure 6

(13) Awards:

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for the period ending 31 October 1969 (RCS: CSPOR-65) (U)

- (a) Submitted to this headquarters and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for final processing: See Inclosure 7
- (b) Recommendations which were approved and finalized by USASUPCOM-CRB and 1st Logistical Command: See Inclosure 8

b. ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations

(1) Logistical Operations

(a) USASUPCOM-CRB continued its mission of supporting the Southern II Corps area. The Command shipped the following amounts of cargo by long haul convoy:

<u>NO CONVOYS</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>S/T DRY CARGO</u>	<u>GALLONS F.O.</u>
22	BMT	6,375	2,396,000
20	DLT	8,311	760,000
11	BLC	2,859	465,000
0	PHT	0	C

(b) The same total number of convoys were conducted this reporting period as during the last reporting period. Wet cargo shipped increased 20.7% while the amount of dry cargo decreased by 3.8%. Convoy planning, to include security, priority assignment of cargo, and monitoring of transportation assets, are controlled from the Logistical Operations Control Center (LOCC). Each convoy is inspected by a Field Grade Officer of the Command prior to departure for the purpose of challenging cargo being transported, insuring proper loading, and checking safety of vehicles. Tactical units providing security and the end stations (i.e. LSA's) are notified by message and telephonically prior to each convoy departure to insure the proper convoy security and rapid backloading operations.

(2) Unit Moves:

(a) The 1/50th Infantry Battalion (Mech) has moved from Binh Dinh Province where it was operating with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, to Phan Thiet where it is now OPOON to Task Force South. Concurrently, the 3/503d Infantry Battalion (ABN) relocated from Bao Loc to Binh Dinh Province and rejoined the 173rd ABN Bde. The move of the 1/50th Inf into the Command's A/O approximately doubles the requirement for tracked vehicle support.

(b) Two engineer units (the 116th Engineer Battalion (Cbt) at Phan Thiet and Bao Loc and the 131st Engineer Company (LE) vicinity of Ban Me Thuot) departed this Command's A/O for return to CONUS as part of

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Project Quick Adjust.

(c) The 45th APU relocated from Phu Cat to this Support Command and has the mission to provide increased mail service in the Phan Thiet area.

(d) The 148th C&S Company was relocated from this Command to the Da Nang Support Command to replace the 1002d C&S Company at Phu Bai, which redeployed to COMUS under Program Quick Adjust.

(e) Under Keystone Cardinal, the HHD, 500th Transportation Group and 61st Transportation Company (POL) were inactivated in country, and the 172d Transportation Company redeployed to COMUS for inactivation.

(f) The major portion of the 129th Maintenance Support Company, 69th Maintenance Battalion (DS) relocated from Nha Trang to Cam Ranh Bay.

(g) The Headquarters, 54th General Support Group relocated from Nha Trang to Cam Ranh Bay on 15 October. Nha Trang support missions are being fulfilled by the Nha Trang Logistical Support Activity (LSA).

(3) Air Drop Operations: During the reporting period the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Delivery) conducted two (2) air drop operations for a total of 181.1 S/T using eleven (11) C-130 aircraft sorties. Classes I, III and V were delivered using the container delivery system (CDS).

(4) Security and Intelligence

(a) Clearance Actions: 480 requests for personnel security actions were submitted; 470 clearances were granted during this reporting period. Forty-five clearance actions are pending.

(b) Document Security: Three (3) scheduled 10% inventories of Secret documents were conducted on 10 July, 15 August, and 15 September 69, respectively. All inventories were completed without discrepancies.

(c) Security Inspections: A total of six (6) Counter-Intelligence (CI) Inspections were conducted during this reporting period. These inspections included personnel security, documents security and passive defense procedures. The units and dates of inspections were as follows: 69th Maintenance Battalion on 7 August 69, 21st Supply and Service Company on 12 August 69, 59th Field Service on 13 August 69, 24th Transportation Battalion on 16 September 69, 24th Transportation Company on 17 September 69, and the 592nd Transportation Company on 18 September 1969.

(d) War Trophies: During this reporting period this section screened

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a total of 62 war trophies. A total of 45 war trophies were cleared for intelligence value and DD Form 603-1 issued for registration.

(e) Patrol Boats Added: A patrol boat was introduced to patrol the northern portion of the Cam Ranh Bay on 1 October 69. The patrol boat, manned with one VN interpreter, one Air Force security guard and two Navy security personnel, has the mission of patrolling the north bay area for sapper/swimmers and keeping sampans out of restricted areas.

(f) Sector II Ground Defense Plan (OPLAN 129-69): Changes to the OPLAN were incorporated into the plan on 5 September 1969 and distributed to all agencies concerned. Changes consisted of defining specific areas of responsibilities for the three sub-sector coordinators and implementing an alert-detect and react-guard system as opposed to the former perimeter system.

(5) Replacement Training

(a) Average monthly attendance at replacement training classes decreased to 322 from last quarter's monthly average of 797. One reason for this decline is that this command received only half as many replacements this quarter as last quarter. Continuous command interest is being stressed to insure that all newly arrived personnel attend Replacement Training.

(b) The following courses of instruction were conducted during the past quarter under SKILLS 1 Bravo Program:

Basic Packing and Preservation	25 Aug - 5 Sep
Preparation of Freight for Air Shipment	6-11 Sep
Project Counter IV PLL	18-25 Sep
IBM Class	20-25 Oct
NCR 500	13-18 Oct
Signal Mvt Tng	3-27 Oct

(6) Plans: During the reporting period, the following operation plans were published: USASUPCOM-CRB OPLAN C79-69 (Continuity of Logistical Operations) (U) and USASUPCOM-CRB OPLAN C103-70 (Contingency Plan for Official Visits by Distinguished Visitors) (U)

(7) Signal

(a) On 14 November 1968, the Communication Center was officially opened for use within the 1st Logistical Command teletype net. The Communication Center operated a secure, full-duplex terminal and provided for message traffic to 1st Logistical Command, USAICC-Vietnam, and the

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Support Commands at Qui Nhon and Da Nang. On 202400Z Sep 69, operation of the Communication Center was terminated on order of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. Equipment that became excess upon deactivation of the Communication Center was turned in to the appropriate supply channels. The Area Communication Center, operated by Company C, 41st Signal Battalion, now handles all traffic between 1st Logistical Command and USASUPCOM-CRB.

(b) On 15 October 1969, operation of the USASUPCOM-CRB Single Sideband Radio Communications network with phone patch service to the Logistical Support Activities (LSA) and the USASUPCOM-CRB Radio Teletype net were turned over to the 54th General Support Group.

c. ACofS, Supply

(1) The Field Ration Condiment Stores were converted from the Issue System to the Monetary Allowance System during this reporting period. This conversion will enable a unit to purchase items in larger quantities, and to reduce purchases of condiments that are in excess in the mess halls. It has been noted that units are not spending all of the money allotted to them by the Monetary Allowance System resulting in a savings to the US Government.

(2) By experimentation, it was found that the \$175,000 excess of non-fat dry milk (NDM) destined for condemnation could be used in the production of cottage cheese. This NDM is now being substituted for the commercial product used by Meadow Gold Dairies.

(3) During this quarter the retrograde and redistribution program for petroleum package products continued to be effective. Retention quantities were based on update requisition objectives (RO). The on-hand inventory at the beginning of the quarter was 10,200 short tons. The ending inventory was 5,900 short tons.

(4) POL Drums: The short service life and the difficulties involved in field recovery of collapsible empty 500 gallon POL drums continues to be a matter of concern to this Command. The present testing procedures consists of inflating the drum with air and conducting a visual inspection for serviceability. Unsatisfactory drums are evacuated to the Qui Nhon repair facility. During the period 11 October to 26 November, 263 empty drums were received. Tests revealed that 58% of these were unsatisfactory.

(5) Lumber for logistical missions remains in short supply. A partial work stoppage has occurred in the care and preservation operations performed under contract by the Vinnell Corporation. Maximum effort was expended to obtain required lumber from the ammo pier reclaim dunnage

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yard, sanitary fills, and from the razing of excess wooden structures.

(6) Self Service Supply Center: The 1st Logistical Command Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) Credit Control System was implemented at the Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang Self Service Supply Centers on 1 October 1969. Unit applications for the establishment of new accounts were forwarded to the ACofS, Supply for review and validation. Credit allocations were computed for those units, validated and the unit was assigned to one of the Self Service Supply Centers as an authorized customer.

(7) Project Thru-Put: During August and September 1554 lines of excess with a value of \$654,194.80 were reported under Project Thru-Put by USASUPCOM-CRB units. Redistribution of 2788 lines with a value of \$370,420.00 was completed during the period.

d. ACofS, Maintenance: Radar equipment deadlines, previously averaging as high as 70% nonoperational, have been reduced to approximately 10%. This reduction is being accomplished through extensive use of contact teams, assistance visits from the field maintenance technicians, and an adjustment of ASL and PLL's. Parts requested as a result of the ASL/PLL overhaul are now being received and have begun to increase the present radar equipment availability rate.

e. ACofS, Transportation

(1) Terminal and Water Transportation: Total port activity this quarter showed a slight decrease over last quarter. The decrease in port activity coincided with a reduction in this Command's shallow draft and highway line-haul assets. The loss of the BDL John U.D. Page in late August has increased the port backlog. However, receipt of two LCU's in October has partially offset the loss of the Page.

(2) Vessels arriving in CRB without prior manifesting and stow plans continue to plague the port.

(3) Highway Operations: The highway assets of the Command continue to be utilized at an increased rate. The 172nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) with personnel and equipment departed the Command during September. These recent developments coupled with the advent of the monsoons will adversely affect our highway movement capability.

(4) The reefer-van shortage will be relieved significantly with the expected arrival of 5 new reefer vans in early November.

f. ACofS, Ammunition

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(1) The Class V Stockage Objectives, Management Levels, and quantities on-hand at the beginning and end of the reporting period in short tons:

(a) GENERAL:

<u>LOCATION</u>		<u>BEGINNING (S/T)</u>	<u>END (S/T)</u>
Phan Thiet LSA	S/O	929	980
	M/L	679	774
	O/H	1130	1068
Ben Me Thuot LSA	S/O	Reconstituted 3	729
	M/L	Sep 69	640
	O/H	-	950
Dalat LSA	S/O	328	311
	M/L	215	274
	O/H	355	294
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	S/O	48,328	48,204
	M/L	42,000	42,519
	O/H	36,225	34,580

(b) DISCUSSION:

1. Stockage objectives are based on weapons densities, issue experience, storage capacity, and usage rates published in USARPAC Reg. 710-15. The Cam Ranh Bay stockage objective includes a 25 day back-up for Da Nang and a 15 day back-up for Qui Nhon.

2. The Ben Me Thuot ASP was reconstituted on 3 Sep 69 due to increased activity and a tactical troop build-up in the Southwest II CTZ area.

(2) Storage capability is based on the planning factor of one (1) short ton per eighteen (18) square feet of storage space. Present construction underway in ASA Charlie at Cam Ranh Bay will increase the storage capacity by approximately 19,000 S/T. The reduction in capacity is based on the change by 1st Logistical Command ammunition storage specifications of 14 to 18 square feet per short ton. The total storage capacity at the beginning and end of the reporting period in short tons are as follows:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>BEGINNING</u>	<u>END</u>
Phan Thiet	1,750	1,361
Ben Me Thuot	Reconstituted 3 Sep 69	1,944
Dalat	1,250	1,250
Cam Ranh Bay	76,127	63,889

(3) Quantities of Class V received and issued in short tons:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUG</u>		<u>SEP</u>		<u>OCT</u>	
	<u>REC</u>	<u>ISS</u>	<u>REC</u>	<u>ISS</u>	<u>REC</u>	<u>ISS</u>
Phan Thiet	510	699	376	682	1,069	609
Ban Me Thuet	N/A	N/A	888	366	953	730
Dalat	345	294	139	134	40	126
Cam Ranh Bay	19,500	11,207	5,400	17,808	17,595	14,448

g. ACofS, Services

(1) Engineering

(a) 1. The Duffle Bag Project Facility was completed and turned over to the user on 25 August 1969.

2. The resurfacing of Pier 2 was completed and accepted by the Installation Engineer on 26 September 1969.

3. The 510 feet on the MMAV bulkhead was transferred to the user on 11 October 1969; however, the relieving platform is yet to be completed.

(b) The USARV Facilities Review Board visited CRB during the period 27-29 October 1969.

(c) The 595th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) arrived at CRB on 1 July 1969 to accomplish horizontal construction projects for a period of four months. A letter was sent through channels to USARV requesting this unit remain at CRB through April 1970 to complete critically needed projects. The request was disapproved and the 595th Engineer Company departed CRB on 1 November 1969 for the 20th Engineer Bde, III CTZ. The 595th Engineer Company completed the earthwork and the sand-cement base for the Y-C ammo road, worked on fire roads and berms in the POL tank farms and performed several minor grading and drainage projects.

(d) This headquarters furnished a waterfront construction priorities list thru Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, to USARV for tasks to be accomplished by the 497th Engineer Company (Port Const). Priorities for troop construction at CRB were as follows:

1. Reinforce and/or replace bulkhead south of Pier 1 and between Piers 1 and 2.

2. Reinforce bulkhead between Piers 2 and 4.

3. Construct finger pier between LST ramps at Pier 5.

(2) Graves Registration: The remains of 134 US Armed Forces and Free

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World Military Assistance Forces (WMAF) personnel were processed through
USASUPCOM-CMB collecting points during the reporting period.

(3) Laundry and Bath: A monthly cost ceiling was placed on contract laundries during this reporting period. Modern Services Laundry was limited to \$97,856.00 per month and Dang Van Minh was limited to \$8,404.00 per month. In order to reach these goals flat work, i.e. sheets, pillow cases, mattress covers and blankets, is being shifted to the field laundries.

(4) Food Services: During the reporting period, an average of 38 food facilities were evaluated each month by the Food Service personnel of this headquarters. 31 "Star Plaque Awards" were presented to superior mess facilities.

(5) Bakery: During the reporting period a total of 1,069,862 pounds (535 S/T) of bread was produced and distributed by the Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay Field bakeries.

(6) Property Disposal:

(a) During July a Property Disposal Training Team from 1st Logistical Command visited the Property Disposal Facility at Cam Ranh Bay. The team returned in September and noted a significant improvement in the operation.

(b) Because of legal difficulties, the terminal scrap contract with Stainless Processing Company was not terminated until 14 October 1969. The contract was originally scheduled for termination during the last reporting period.

(c) During the reporting period, the two property disposal yards within the command processed 3,363 short tons of usable property and 6,171 short tons of scrap. Approximately \$539,600 of usable property was re-issued to various units within this command.

h. Provost Marshal: During the period 1 July - 31 September 1969, Command emphasis was placed once again on Serious Incidents. It was noted that SIR's increased from 36 during the 2nd Quarter to 44 during the 3rd Quarter, CY 69. The increase is attributable to an increase in traffic accidents. The first quarter recorded 12 T/A's; 11 of which involved death of US and/or Vietnamese personnel. The 2nd quarter recorded only 3 T/A's of which 2 resulted in death to personnel. The 3rd quarter recorded 18 T/A's of which 6 were fatal, 11 resulted in injuries to personnel and 1 resulted in the total loss to a government vehicle.

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2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned

a. ACofS, Personnel

(1) Critical loss of personnel

(a) Observation: Replacements are coming in but not in sufficient numbers to keep pace with the early departures based on adjusted DEROS's.

(b) Evaluation: As the manpower ceiling is more rigidly enforced and emphasis is placed on assignment based on General Order authorization and DEROS adjustments, personnel shortages will be magnified.

(c) Recommendations: That the modifications to TOE's and IMA's are evaluated and approved and General Orders issued more rapidly so that the document upon which a unit is being filled more closely approaches current requirements for assigning personnel.

(2) Traffic Accident Rate.

(a) Observation: The number of traffic accidents have been on the increase.

(b) Evaluation: Several accidents have resulted in fatalities and many in the loss of Government equipment and supplies. Most of these are attributable to driver carelessness.

(c) Recommendation: That each command establish a remedial driving course for personnel whose driving ability indicate the need for additional instruction. The basic theme in all instruction should be defensive driving.

(3) Polarization of Racial Cliques.

(a) Observation: Groups of similar individuals drift together and frequently develop into a constructive or more often destructive power element.

(b) Evaluation: When the men are left on their own they tend to run themselves. Eventually they do what they want, they shirk discipline, and trouble develops to a high level before it is detected.

(c) Recommendation: That the company officers and NCO's be required to spend more time in the units associating with the men and keeping track of what is going on in and around the unit area.

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(4) Substandard Appearance of Combat Area Troops

(a) Observation: Men serving in combat-type areas tend to become lax in their personal appearance.

(b) Evaluation: Soldiers have a tendency to relax their dress standards when they are in a combat area. Contributing factors such as personal convenience, work conditions and relaxed attitude toward garrison-type details further this tendency. Accordingly, the subject of uniform violations requires special attention to re-establish the desired standards of a soldier's appearance.

(c) Recommendation: The establishment of military courtesy patrols at key facilities such as the post exchange and service clubs provides for on-the-spot corrections and the recording of violations for correction at the unit.

(5) Personnel Slots

(a) Observation: 39th AG (BPO) operates under a MTO&E staffed for a Base Post Office, while additionally performing the missions of an Army Post Office in seven areas in Southern II Corps Tactical Zone.

(b) Evaluation: A proposed MTO&E to account for the additional slots was disapproved.

(c) Recommendation: That this unit be maintained at 130% strength in order to accomplish its basic mission.

(6) Records

(a) Observation: Individuals are being assigned to the 39th AG (BPO) with less than acceptable past histories. Postal work requires certain standards be met as far as personal history is concerned.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel involved in criminal actions prior to entering the service are poor risks for postal work where reliability and individual integrity are primary assignment factors.

(c) Recommendation: That the 39th AG (BPO) interview all personnel assigned and review personnel records before accepting assignees.

(7) Sealand-CONEX Operation

(a) Observation: The lack of a large, all-weather building to house the entire Sealand-CONEX mail operation.

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(b) Evaluation: During the monsoon season the Sealand-CONEX operation must close down. This causes a delay in mail service. Each monsoon season this unit must borrow a building to process the Sealand-CONEX mail. Construction of a new facility was disapproved.

(c) Recommendation: That a suitable all-weather building be constructed/provided to meet the requirements of the Base Post Office. Construction costs would be offset in one year by the savings in the amount of claims incurred from damaged and wet mail.

b. ACofS, Supply

(1) Condiment Stores

(a) Observation: It was believed that money could be saved by converting condiment stores from the Issue System to the Monetary Allowance System.

(b) Evaluation: Under the Monetary Allowance System, a unit may purchase some condiments in large quantities and reduce receipt of other condiments that are in excess in the mess halls.

(c) Recommendation: That the Monetary Allowance System for Condiment Stores be continued.

(2) Non-fat Dry Milk (NDM)

(a) Observation: There was an excess of NDM on hand in depots in RVN which would be condemned if not used in some manner.

(b) Evaluation: This NDM can be saved from condemnation. By experimentation, a method was conceived whereby NDM can be substituted for the commercial mix in the production of cottage cheese resulting in substantial savings to the Government.

(c) Recommendation: That NDM from other Depots in RVN be used to produce cottage cheese to preclude further condemnation loss of NDM stocks.

(3) Refrigerator Vans (Semi-trailer)

(a) Observation: Antiquated military refrigerator vans should be replaced with modern, efficient refrigerated vans.

(b) Evaluation: Considerable difficulty has been experienced in shipping perishable rations by surface due to lack of equipment and the low operational status of on-hand 7 1/2 ton refrigerated vans. Of the 32 vans

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authorized the Command, only 10 are on hand. Of those on hand, one (1) is fully operational, six (6) are limited-operational and three (3) are nonoperational. As a result of rugged terrain, poor roads and the age of the equipment, availability of reefer vans again reached critical levels during this reporting period.

(c) Recommendation: That the US Army procure a reliable refrigerated van similar to Sealand vans for shipment of perishable cargo by convoy to the end stations.

(4) Identification of Materiel

(a) Observation: The Phan Thiet LSA received other than requisitioned items for the construction of a four inch JP-4 pipeline facility. Wood and aluminum containers labelled to contain 10,000 gallon collapsible bags or 4" volatile couplings contained other items.

(b) Evaluation: In this instance used wooden and aluminum containers originally used for packaging 10,000 gallon bags and volatile couplings were reused to package other items without changing the identification data on the containers to reflect the new contents.

(c) Recommendation: That containers which are to be reused have old identification data obliterated prior to reuse and that proper identification of new contents be posted.

c. ACofS, Maintenance: Contract Maintenance Facilities

(1) Observation: Policy of utilizing off-shore maintenance facilities for GS/Depot category repairs results in a prolonged nonavailability of equipment and resultant high transportation costs.

(2) Evaluation: Contract maintenance facilities could be expanded to assume a greater percentage of this repair. Such expansion could lead to a more flexible response to combat and combat support requirements by shortening the turn-around time for GS/Depot category repairs. A further advantage of the expansion is the boost to local economy and expansion of a pool of skilled and trained local nationals available to assume future requirements for VNAF.

(3) Recommendation: That policies be revised to increase capabilities of contract maintenance facilities and usage.

d. ACofS, Transportation: Loading Manifests

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(1) Observation: Prior receipt of manifests and stow plans are required to adequately plan for the proper discharge of incoming vessels. The number of stevedore gangs and the type of equipment required can be determined beforehand if the manifest and other documentation are available.

(2) Evaluation: Loading ports are required to send the vessel's manifests to the discharge port within 48 hours after vessel departure. Compliance with the above by CONUS shippers would eliminate unnecessary and costly delays at the discharge port. When a vessel is diverted, the diverting authority must insure that the new discharge port is sent a copy of the vessel's manifest.

(3) Recommendation: That ADP equipment be installed at all major military ports to transceive manifests in advance of a ship's arrival to preclude unprogrammed arrivals.

a. ACofS, Ammunition

(1) Designation of Project Officer for High Priority Resupply Missions.

(a) Observation: Failure occurred in the handling of high priority resupply missions.

(b) Evaluation: There are several peculiarities in ammunition supply. For instance, some 2.75 inch rockets come with complete rounds in a box. However, the same DODIC may also come with motors in one box and warheads in another. A project officer at each echelon insures coordination and supervision of the supply action through completion. At the battalion level the project officer insures that the proper DODIC is loaded and arrives at the proper location at the air freight terminal on time and in the proper loading configuration.

(c) Recommendation: That project officers continue to be appointed at each echelon for each CE/ER Shipment Priority.

(2) Coordination with TMA

(a) Observation: A number of cut-of-command supply directives were past RDD's. This was a constant recurring problem.

(b) Evaluation: Arrangements were made so that a representative from TMA made liaison visits to the office of ACofS, Ammunition three times a week. Also at this time critical shipments are made known to TMA even

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though they may not have a higher shipment priority. This personal co-
ordination has resulted in fewer shipments missing RDD's.

(c) Recommendation: That ACofS, Ammunition and Transportation Move-
ment Agency continue close coordination.

f. ACofS, Services: Operations - Engineer Effort

(1) Observation: The 497th Engineer Company (Fort Construction), was
stationed at CRB until January 1969, at which time it was moved into the
Saigon area. For a period of eight months there was no engineer troop
port construction/maintenance effort available at CRB. The contractor
developed a waterfront construction/maintenance capability to perform one
project at a time which was an unacceptable rate.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The condition of the bulkhead between Piers 1 and 2 and south of
Pier 1 and the lack of port hardstand seriously effect this Command's
capability to perform its mission. There is insufficient staging areas
at the port to accommodate incoming and retrograde cargo. These staging
areas are needed now; however, with the current available troop assets,
these staging areas will not be available for at least another year.

(b) The USARPAC waiver allowing ammunition loading and discharging at
South Beach expires on 31 January 1970. A request to renew the waiver is
being processed which will permit the continuation of ammunition opera-
tions at South Beach. Construction of a finger pier in the vicinity of
Pier 5 has been requested. Completion of this pier will permit most
ammunition operations to be conducted in the Pier 5 area. However, the
South Beach facility will still be required for ammunition operations in
those instances where there is an overflow of shallow draft vessels or
more than two deep draft vessels are in port at the same time. Construc-
tion of the finger pier is expected, based upon the present availability
of port construction effort at Cam Ranh Bay, to begin in the late 1970 -
1971 time frame.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) That additional engineer port construction effort be provided at
CRB as soon as possible.

(b) A major port should always have available an engineer port
construction unit or a portion thereof.

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
AVCA CRB-CO-O

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the period ending 31 October 1969 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

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Incls 1 - 8 wd HQ, DA


WILLIAM J. WILLIAM
Colonel, Ordn
Acting Commander

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AVCA GO-MH (13 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOH -65 (n2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

; 6 DEC 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command for the quarterly period ending 31 Oct 69 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning critical loss of personnel, page 13, paragraph a(1). Concur. It is recommended that general orders, summary MTOE, and detailed MTOE be processed and distributed as a package. Under the current system, general orders are being received several weeks to a month before authorization documents. It is extremely difficult for units to organize/reorganize when no MTOE is available.

b. Reference item concerning traffic accident rate, page 13, paragraph a(2). Concur. The requirement for the conduct of a remedial driving course is contained in Annex A to Appendix B to LC Regulation 20-1.

c. Reference item concerning polarization of racial cliques, page 13, paragraph a(3). Concur. The recommendation is sound where current directives are not fully applied. The directives are:

(1) Letter, this headquarters, "Billeting of NCO Personnel," dated 23 Jun 69 which directs commanders to assign at least one NCO, E6 or above, to each enlisted barracks. The NCO is responsible for morale, welfare and discipline of the men residing within that barracks.

(2) LC Reg 20-1 provides that commanders should make themselves available at a designated place each week to hear individual's complaints or suggestions.

(3) LC CIR 28-2, 12 Jan 69, provides for "The Know Your Man Program". This program includes an open door policy for all commanders in order that subordinates have a means of expressing their feelings at any time. It also provides for councils whose purpose is to improve morale and welfare, communications and discipline.

d. Reference item concerning personnel slots, page 14, paragraph a(5). Nonconcur. Personnel are assigned to this command by USAV based authorized strength which has been further reduced by a 93.9% manning level.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command for period ending 31 October 1969 nCS CSFOR-65 (h2) (b)

To adopt this recommendation would result in one of the other support commands having to absorb this overstrength in USASUPCOM, ChB. This headquarters will continue to assign personnel based on the manning level of each support command, however this headquarters has no objection to USASUPCOM, ChB maintaining the 39th BPO at 130% of authorized from within their own resources.

e. Reference item concerning the requirement for a building to house the Sealand-CONEX mail operation, page 14, paragraph a(7). Nonconcur. A request for construction of a building for this activity was not favorably considered by the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command Engineer when it was submitted by the using unit. As a result, no request for the project has been received by this headquarters. If the Support Command reevaluates the situation and determines that such a facility is required, a construction request should be submitted according to standard procedures.

f. Reference item concerning condiment stores, page 15, paragraph b(1). Concur. L.C. Supply Bulletin 31-4, Self-Service Condiment and Accessory Food Stores, dated 30 March 1967, states that Class I supply Points supporting ten or more units will establish self-service condiment and accessory food stores.

g. Reference item concerning Non-fat Dry Milk, page 15, paragraph b(2). Concur. This action has been accomplished.

h. Reference item concerning refrigerated vans, page 15, paragraph b(3). Concur. This should be included in the long range plans for the Army as the current 7½ ton refrigerated vans are proving unreliable in Vietnam. This matter was discussed with a representative from the U.S. Army Natick Laboratories during a recent meeting at this Headquarters. Five new 7½ ton refrigerated vans were delivered to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command during November 1969.

i. Reference item concerning identification of materiel, page 16, paragraph b(4). Concur. All containers should be marked with the proper identification of the contents. The basic requirements for marking of containers are specified in MIL-STD-129. This headquarters supplemented MIL-STD-129 with the publication of Care and Preservation Special Bulletin No. 1-69, Requirements for Identification Markings on Exterior Containers dated 24 July 1969.

j. Reference item concerning maintenance facilities, page 16, paragraph c. Concur. The utilization of off-shore maintenance facilities for GS/Depot category repairs results in prolonged nonavailability of equipment and resultant high transportation costs. This is true in the

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the Cam Manh Bay Support Command for period ending 31 October 1969 NCS CSFOh-65 (n2) (U)

area of marine maintenance, tank-automotive and engineer construction maintenance. The GS/Depot marine maintenance capability is being increased for FY 71. The implementation of Phase III Standardization will reduce the 1st Logistical Command's GS capability by 5 GS companies. The Cam Manh Bay GS maintenance contract maintenance effort is being increased during FY71 to compensate for the increased shortfall in capability. Increased funding for the maintenance budget will require coordination with higher headquarters.

k. Reference item concerning loading manifest, page 16, paragraph d Concur.

(1) There are various methods available to port commanders to prevent arrivals of vessels without adequate documentation. When cargo traffic messages are received, a suspense file may be set up to ascertain that a vessel is approaching without previous receipt of manifests. Requests may then be sent to POE's for transmission of manifests. The completion of the ADP program at Cam Manh Bay will lessen the incidence of non-receipt of manifests.

(2) In a recent letter to all SUPCOM's the CG 1st Log Comd outlined the problem of "suspense" vessel arrivals and some of the possible solutions including telephone exchange of information between the in-country water ports to ensure that all parties are kept up to date on impending arrivals.

(3) This HQ recently sent a message to all major commands, and MAFS, providing revised distribution of water cargo manifests and documentation and emphasizing the need for timely dispatch of manifests. Receipt of manifests will continue and all efforts will be made to ensure that documentation arrives at a sufficient interval before arrival of vessels.

(4) As regards the recommendation that all major military ports be provided an ADP capability, the RVN ports were among the few in the world which did not have such capability. Upon completion of program implementation at Qui Nhon in late December '69, all RVN ports except the Navy operated port of Da Nang will have access to ADP equipment. However, the best of ADP equipment will not by itself ensure timely receipt of manifest data. Actions such as specified in paragraph (1) above, are essential to ensure that advance data is received in a timely manner.

l. Reference item concerning the designation of project officer for high priority resupply mission, page 17, paragraph (1). This headquarters is currently revising Appendix A to LC Reg 55-40 which includes requirements that:

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AVCA GO-MH (13 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the Cam Ranh Bay Command for period ending 31 October 1969 AGC USFOR-05 (1-2)

(1) An officer or NCO (E-7 or above) verify the cargo at the depot against the TCMD and accompany it to the aerial port to ensure delivery and to verify departure of the cargo.

(2) An officer or NCO (E-7 or above) receipt for the cargo, verify its completeness and accompany it to its destination.

m. Reference item concerning engineer construction effort, page 15, paragraph f. Concur. The only troop effort available in Cam Ranh Bay is the 497th Engineer Co (PC) which is also working on a project at Qui Nhon. The repair of the seawall on which the unit is now working at Cam Ranh is expected to take approximately one year to complete. Assuming that the pier will be approved by USAFV, unless additional effort is made available, construction cannot be accomplished by the desired 31 January 1970 date. The entire scope of approved work in the Cam Ranh Bay area will not be known until a review of requested projects now being conducted by the USAFV Facilities Review Board is completed. Experience in port operations has shown that a port construction unit should be continually available to make needed repairs on waterfront facilities without this capability, considerable delay can be experienced through the loss of critical facilities.

3. (U) Cam Ranh Bay has been notified to follow the proper format in Section II, Lessons Learned in future OMLIs.

4. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839


C. D. STAFFOR
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, CRB

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AVHGC-DST (13 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the period ending 31 October 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Critical Loss of Personnel", page 13, paragraph 2a(1), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a; Concur in recommendation that the completion of a MTOE/MTDA action be completed more rapidly. However, these actions must be forwarded to DA for evaluation and approval. Experience has shown that review at each higher headquarters takes time. A revision to The Army Authorizations Documents System (TAADS), a portion of which has already been implemented, is designed to reduce the lag time between submission and approval of MTOE/MTDA change requests. Evaluation and forwarding of MTOE/MTDA changes are accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

b. Reference item concerning "Traffic Accident Rate", page 13, paragraph 2a(2), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2b; concur. Subordinate commands are required to conduct remedial driving training as outlined in USARV Regulation 385-55, and 1st Logistical Command Regulation 385-1.

c. Reference item concerning "Polarisation of Racial Cliques", page 13, paragraph 2a(3), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c; concur. Each serviceman in a position of authority should be alert to the attitudes and feelings of unit personnel. During a recent visit to Vietnam, Mr. L. Howard Bennett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights), stated that every effort should be made to maintain an open channel of communication. To provide a community atmosphere, it is necessary to have the company officers and NCOs to take a great deal of interest in their men. This approach seeks solutions to their problems and prevents polarization.

d. Reference item concerning "Substandard Appearance of Combat Area Troops", page 14, paragraph 2a(4); concur. The appearance of soldiers is an indicator of the military discipline displayed by an individual or unit. It is the responsibility of commanders to insure that military personnel present a neat and soldierly appearance.

AVHGC-DST (13 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the period ending 31 October 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. Reference item concerning "Personnel Slots", page 14, paragraph 2a(5), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d; concur with 1st Indorsement. No action by higher headquarters is required.

f. Reference item concerning "Records", page 14, paragraph 2a(6). The problem presented should be resolved by Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. Personnel replacements are assigned to major command level only. The distribution, screening and/or interviewing of personnel is the responsibility of the major subordinate commander concerned.

g. Reference item concerning "Sealand-CONEX Operation", page 14, paragraph 2a(7); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e; concur with 1st Indorsement. No action by higher headquarters is required.

h. Reference item concerning "Refrigerator Vans (Semi-trailer)", page 15, paragraph 2b(3), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2h; concur. For 45 days during Oct - Nov 69, representatives from Natick Laboratories and MECON visited 1st Logistical Command. Seven refrigerator vans (7½ ton) were modified by replacing the 6 H.P. military standard reefer engine with a QPL ONAN engine. After field tests were run on the modified vans, the ONAN engine proved to be far superior to the military standard engine. Headquarters, USARV is awaiting publication of the field test results.

i. Reference item concerning "Contract Maintenance Facilities", page 16, paragraph 2c, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j; concur. The recommendation to expand Vinnell is under study by USARV and 1st Logistical Command at the present time. The Vinnell Fixed Field Maintenance Facility could be expanded to the point where it could provide services to all of RVN, rather than just to Cam Ranh Bay. However, GVN limitations on the hire of third country nationals (TCN) must be resolved. The submitting unit has been advised of the above.

j. Reference item concerning "Loading Manifests", page 16, paragraph 2d, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2k; concur. USASUPCOM Cam Ranh Bay now has the capability to receive electrically transmitted manifests.


k. Reference item concerning "Designation of Project Officer for High Priority Resupply Missions", page 17, paragraph 2e(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2l; Concur, as long as the project officer's normal job is associated with the action and this is an additional duty. If this is not the case, then those normally responsible for this task will rely on the project officer to do the job. Proper, accurate, and timely documentation including a well thought out plan, programmed to meet the requirements and proper coordination are the key to successful handling of high priority resupply missions.

AVHQG-DST (13 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the period ending 31 October 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

1. Reference item concerning "Engineer Effort", page 16, paragraph 2f; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2n. Concur in part. An additional port construction platoon will be moved to Cam Ranh Bay after completion of the Qui Nhon barge wharf. Nonconcur that a portion of a port construction unit should be continually available at a port complex. Port construction unit assets are insufficient to allow continual assignment on a normal basis to major port complexes.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. D. MURRAY

CPT, USA
Assistant Commander

Cy furn:
USASUPCOM, CRB
1st LOG COMD

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GPOP-DT (13 Nov 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

Chheit
CPT, USA
ARMY
11/11/69

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified.)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2d. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
3. REPORT TITLE		2d. GROUP	
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.			
5. AUTHORISER (First name, middle initial, last name) CG, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay			
6. REPORT DATE 13 November 1969	7d. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 30	7e. NO. OF REPS	
8d. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO	9d. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 694192		
b. PROJECT NO. N/A	10d. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		
13. ABSTRACT			

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